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Abstract 
 
The new Zealand public reform process of the late 1980s and early 1990s was notable for its 
attempt to clarify public accountability through the specification of outputs, contractual agreements 
and the disaggregation of government departments into smaller, more sharply focused agencies.  
While the reforms achieved managerial improvements, the accountability regime was less 
successful because of the difficulties of specification and the continuing robustness of ministerial 
responsibility in the face of attempts to limit the political control and accountability.  
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Abstract: The new Zealand public reform process of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
was notable for its attempt to clarify public accountability through the specification of 
outputs, contractual agreements and the disaggregation of government departments 
into smaller, more sharply focused agencies.  While the reforms achieved managerial 
improvements, the accountability regime was less successful because of the 
difficulties of specification and the continuing robustness of ministerial responsibility 
in the face of attempts to limit the political control and accountability.    
 
I: Reassessing the New Zealand Model 
 
New Zealand holds a special place in the recent history of public sector reform.  In 
three major pieces of legislation in the 1980s (the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, 
the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989) it implemented a 
particularly radical version of what became known as the ‘new public management’ 
(NPM) and indeed provided an archetype of that movementii. The fact that reform was 
premised on a coherent theoretical blueprintiii  which was then followed through with 
remarkable thoroughness and consistency marked New Zealand out as especially 
interesting to academic analysts as well as to practitioners with a taste for rational 
principle rather than incremental pragmatism. The degree of principled consistency 
was always somewhat overstatediv and the system was subject to constant adjustment 
after its initial enactment. None the less, it stands out as a heroic, and ultimately (and 
predictably) unsuccessful, attempt to ground public management on clear assumptions 
and unambiguous principles. 
 
Clarity was the watchword of the reforms. The root causes of government inefficiency 
and ineffectiveness were perceived to be the failure to specify the objectives of 
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government agencies and confusion over roles (between politicians and public 
servants and within public agencies)v .  Once each agency and each key actor had 
their role clarified and their objectives specified, they could be freed from debilitating 
controls over inputs and processes. They could also be more readily held accountable 
for their performance in terms of clearly specified roles and objectives.   
From these assumptions followed most of the key elements of the new systemvi  such 
as: the separation of the roles of ministers and departmental chief executives (CEs), 
with ministers responsible for choosing ‘outcomes’ and CEs responsible for 
delivering ‘outputs’; the emphasis on clear specification and costing of departmental 
outputs; the separation between the government’s interest as ‘purchaser’ of public 
services and its interest as ‘owner’ of government agencies (and the consequent 
distinction between ‘vote’ ministers and ‘responsible’ ministers); the decoupling of 
non-departmental agencies (‘crown entities’ and ‘state owned-enterprises’) from 
ministerial direction; the disaggregation of large multi-function departments into more 
narrowly focused policy ministries, service delivery agencies and independent 
monitoring agencies; the reliance on explicit contract-like agreements to spell out the 
government’s expectations from individual CEs and agencies. 
 
The New Zealand system has been subject to extensive examinationvii , including two 
major government-sponsored reviews viii   as well as several thorough academic 
assessments. ix   In terms of improved efficiency and effectiveness, considerable 
benefits have been found to flow from the relaxation of central agency controls over 
inputs, the reorientation of agencies towards results and the adoption of strategic 
planning. Savings have been achieved through the decoupling of public service 
provision from core government departments, for instance through outsourcing, 
corporatisation and privatisation.   
How far these benefits are due to the unique features of New Zealand’s version of 
NPM, such as the strict output/outcome distinction, disaggregation into more sharply 
focused agencies, and a reliance on formal contractual agreements, is open to question.  
Broadly similar results have been have been observed, for instance, in Australiax, 
which deliberately eschewed a contractual approach and opted for amalgamation 
rather than disaggregation as a means of achieving efficiencies, not introducing its 
own version of outcome/output budgeting until the late 1990s. The main advantages 
for the New Zealand public sector appear to have flowed from managerialist 
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initiatives, such as increased autonomy for managers and a new emphasis on 
objectives and planning, rather than from formal contracts or disaggregation. xi   
Supposed gains in efficiency and effectiveness are far from uncontestedxii but will not 
be discussed further in this article which focuses more on public accountability.  
 
The system is now subject to major revision, involving a fundamental reappraisal of 
some its assumptions.  The Labour/Alliance government,  elected in 1999, established 
a Review of the Centre Advisory Group, which reported in late 2001.xiii  The Group 
identified a number of weaknesses and also recommended several changes, including 
the need for departments to align themselves more closely with the government’s 
goals by engaging more positively with outcomes as well as with outputs. Improved 
integration of service delivery across multiple agencies was also called for. Given that 
the Advisory Group included the chief executives of the three key central agencies 
(State Services Commission, Treasury, and Prime Minister and Cabinet), the 
envisaged changes were naturally described as refinements to the existing system 
which did not require any fundamental rethinking of its assumptions.  Government 
ministers, however, such as the Minister of State Services, Trevor Mallard, have been 
more outspoken in their criticism of the narrowness of the system and in their 
advocacy of major change.xiv  
 
The envisaged changes reflect the new UK-inspired emphasis on ‘whole of 
government’ which is in some respects the antithesis of the New Zealand system,  
stressing complex networks rather than clear lines of accountability and shared values 
rather than detailed contracts. International trends have shifted and New Zealand is no 
longer in the vanguard but now looks more like a dangerously exposed outlier. Its 
new path is more moderate and mainline, aiming at convergence with Westminster 
counterparts, Australia, Canada and the UK.xv  While official New Zealand opinion 
talks carefully of additions and modifications, leaving the fundamentals of the former 
system intact, the extent of back-tracking is not lost on more independent observers, 
such as Graham Scott, Secretary of the Treasury from 1986 to 1993 and one of the 
system’s key architects.  As he ruefully remarks xvi, overseas visitors are now less 
likely to come to Wellington in search of new ideas. The public sector reform caravan 
has moved on.  
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In Hegel’s famous metaphor, the setting of the sun prompts the owl of Minerva to 
spread its wings. When an era is finishing, reliable historical analysis can begin.  
Looking back on New Zealand’s  decade of public sector experiment, now that the 
system is being significantly modified, allows the peculiar strengths and weaknesses 
of the New Zealand approach to become more sharply defined.  This article 
concentrates on one aspect of that system, its structure of public accountability.  It 
begins with an outline of the structure as outlined in the original reforms, 
concentrating on the unique aspects, and then considers a number of accountability 
problems that emerged through the 1990s which underline the difficulty of securing a 
tidy and coherent accountability regime. 
 
II: The reformers’ accountability agenda 
 
Accountability has been a central component of the new public management agenda 
worldwide, providing the key incentive for newly liberated public managers to deliver 
the objectives set for them by governments.  Comparison with the private sector 
revealed a number of deficiencies in the accountability regimes of most government 
agencies and public servants.xvii  Public managers were scrutinised too heavily for the 
procedures and processes they follow and not sufficiently for the results of their 
activities.  Government institutions should emulate the ‘tight-loose’ structure favoured 
by business, in which managers were held accountable in terms of tightly defined 
objectives but given a relatively free rein about the choice of means. At the same time, 
public managers were too subject to political accountability from elected politicians 
willing to intervene in any administrative act in response to political pressure.  If 
managers were to be free to deliver their specified objectives efficiently and 
effectively, they needed to be able to make their own decisions about how to achieve 
these objectives.  Political accountability which shines the spotlight of public attention 
on any issue, no matter how trivial, tended to distract public managers from their 
goals and to make them risk averse. It was better therefore to rely on other, less 
politicised mechanisms such as independent regulators and auditors or accountability 
directly to members of the public. The NPM accountability agenda can therefore be 
summed up as advocating a change in the subject matter (for what) of accountability, 
from inputs and processes to results; and a change in the processes (how) away from 
political avenues, and towards regulators and the public. 
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The New Zealand version of this agenda, as already noted, was remarkable for its 
general emphasis on clarity and specification, which applied to accountability in all its 
dimensions, in the specification of who is to be accountable to whom, for what and 
how.  Individuals and agencies were to be held accountable in terms of detailed 
agreements negotiated with government ministers which set out their respective duties 
(for what).  For core government departments, the central mechanism for such 
specification was to be the formal annual purchase agreement between ministers and 
departments. This set out the outputs that departments would provide their ‘vote’ 
ministers. Individual outputs were to be collected into output classes, which were then 
separately costed on an accrual basis.  Output measures needed also to be provided by 
which the quantity, quality and timeliness of each output class could be assessed.   
 
The same information was also incorporated into the annual performance agreement 
between the minister and the chief executive and as well as into the departmental 
forecast reports in which departments set out their expected performance (since 
discontinued).  Departments were also required to report in terms of their proposed 
contribution to the government strategic objectives, through strategic result areas and 
more detailed key result areas. ‘Ownership’ interests, that is the government’s interest 
in maintaining the long-term viability of departments as distinct from the purchase of 
annual outputs, were separately spelled out in a further planning document. Non-
departmental agencies (‘crown entities) that provided public services were required to 
prepare a statement of objectives specifying the classes of outputs to be produced 
while State-Owned Enterprises needed to provide a statement of corporate intent.   
 
These forward-looking documents then provided the basis for ex ante accountability, 
as chief executives and agencies reported on performance in terms of their agreed 
outputs and according to the agreed measures. The clearer and less ambiguous the 
function of each agency within the system, whether as purchaser, provider, owner or 
monitor, the more easily its desired performance could be defined and the more 
readily it could be held accountable for meeting this performance.   
 
Increased accountability for performance was accompanied by reduced accountability 
for decisions about how resources were to be used in pursuit of agreed goals.  
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Efficiency, it was argued, would be improved if individual agencies and managers had 
the freedom to make their own choices about how best to achieve their objectives.  
Thus, accountability to central agencies for matters such as staffing levels or the 
purchase of office accommodation was greatly reduced, allowing managers to make 
considerable savings.  Accrual accounting, by providing managers with reliable 
information about their financial resources and commitments, provided a base from 
which they could make savings and increase productivity.xviii  Again, provided the end 
was clearly specified, control over the means could be relaxed, allowing a more 
‘tight-loose’ model of accountability closer to that found in the private sector.  Indeed, 
the relaxation of such controls and accountability was the most widely recognised 
advantage of the new system.xix  
 
Reporting of departmental performance (the how of accountability) was to take place 
through a number of avenues, many of which were well-established, for instance 
through ministers to Parliament and the public, to parliamentary committees, to 
central agencies such as the Treasury and the State Services Commission, and to the 
Audit Office.  These avenues in some cases have become more formalised, 
particularly that between ministers and chief executives which is now a matter of 
specified agreements rather than informal understanding.  In addition, a number of 
new regulatory and monitoring bodies were introduced for non-departmental agencies 
as a means of reducing their political accountability through departments and 
ministers, thus confirming their arms-length position relation to government. Thus, 
the performance of SOEs and other Crown companies was monitored by the Crown 
Company Monitoring Advisory Unit while schools became accountable to the 
independent Education Review Office.xx  
 
A notable contrast between the New Zealand system and most other versions of the 
new public management was New Zealand’s comparative lack of interest in 
improving accountability directly to members of the public who use public services. 
One of the key objectives of the reforms was certainly to provide improved service to 
the public.xxi  But the mechanisms chosen did not involve giving ordinary members of 
the public a greater right to complain about service. Nor did they encourage front-line 
bureaucrats to answer directly to those whose services they provided.  In this respect, 
the New Zealand version differed from that of the United Kingdom where the 
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Citizens’ Charters has played a key role in setting out the rights of individual citizens, 
including their rights of access to complaints procedures. New Zealand also diverged 
from the reform movement in the United States where one of the main aims of 
empowering local officials has been to allow them to become more responsive and 
accountable to individual communities and citizens.xxii Accountability procedures for 
individual citizens certainly exist within the New Zealand system, for instance 
through the courts or the Ombudsman (an institution which New Zealand was the first 
Westminster regime to introduce in 1962). However, with the exception of the 
troubled health sector where new grievance procedures were added to meet particular 
problems of professional incompetence,xxiii  the reformers did not seek to strengthen 
such mechanisms.  Instead the main avenue of public accountability was through the 
representative institution of Parliament.  Public agencies were accountable to 
ministers and to Parliament who, in turn, were accountable to the voters who elected 
them.    
 
The stated reason for the emphasis on upward accountability to ministers and 
Parliament was, again, the search for clarity. Managers needed uncluttered lines of 
accountability if they were to be able to manage efficiently and effectively. ‘[T]he 
chain of accountability [should be] undivided with the Minister at its head’.xxiv By 
implication, any introduction of further avenues of direct scrutiny would blur both 
accountability and responsibility. In particular, managers needed to be fully in charge 
of their agencies which meant that their subordinates should be accountable upwards 
through the organisational hierarchy and not independently accountable to the public.  
By contrast, where upwards accountability to superiors is combined with direct 
accountability to members of the public, the loyalties of front-line staff can be divided 
in  different directions,xxv  thus compromising the leader’s control. 
 
Accountability for the quality of public services has thus been primarily directed 
upwards to ministers and to Parliament, by means of agreed outputs directed to 
preferred outcomes. Individual service providers have certainly encouraged to be 
more responsive to the public’s needs, by the detailed specification of service 
standards in contractual agreements and by the introduction of competition between 
alternative providers. In this respect, at least, the New Zealand reforms share in the 
general NPM emphasis on improved customer service and client focus. But the New 
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Zealanders, arguably correctly,xxvi  have not identified responsiveness to clients, in the 
sense of sensitivity to their clients’ wishes, with accountability to their clients. Strictly 
speaking, accountability is a ‘voice’ mechanism, involving the right to call someone 
to account in terms of a prior duty or obligation. The contractual obligation for the 
provision of public services is normally between the government and the provider. 
Members of the public are beneficiaries of service provision as specified in the 
contract. But, unlike customers who purchase services directly from a commercial 
company, they are not formal parties to the contract and therefore lack any 
accountability rights under the contract (Martin 1995, 51).  In so far as the New 
Zealand system has depended on formal contractual obligations as a basis for 
accountability, the public have been excluded from any direct accountability 
relationships with providers. 
 
III: The constitutional framework 
 
The value placed on a clear line of accountability through chief executives to 
ministers, Parliament and the public reflects the constitutional structure that existed in 
New Zealand until the mid 1990s. New Zealand was an extreme version of 
majoritarian democracy, more ‘Westminster’ than Westminster itself  – unitary, 
unicameral, with a simple plurality electoral system providing single-party majorities, 
and with limited judicial review.xxvii  In all Westminster systems, but particularly in 
the purer forms such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the central mechanism 
of government accountability is the chain of ministerial and parliamentary 
responsibility, which makes officials answer to their superiors, chief executives to 
ministers, ministers to Parliament and Parliament to the people. In New Zealand, with 
its comparatively small scale and traditions of populist responsiveness, ministers have 
always been readily available to the public and expected to react decisively to public 
pressure. Government officials brought up in that system would take it for granted 
that ministers could impose their chosen policy directions on departments and that 
they would be politically accountable for these choices to the public through the 
conventions of ministerial and parliamentary responsibility, to Parliament, the media 
and the electorate in regular, three-yearly elections.  Such an institutional context is a 
polar opposite from that found in a system of separated powers such as the United 
States, where department heads see themselves as ‘accountability jugglers’, xxviii  
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caught between the conflicting demands of the White House, Congress, the state 
governments and the courts.  
 
New Zealand’s constitution has since been significantly modified by a change to the 
electoral system from simple plurality to mixed member proportional, first 
implemented in the 1996 election. The new system militates against single-party 
majority government and forces ministers to negotiate key policies with politicians 
from other parties.  The change was largely provoked by the reform movement itself 
which was seen to have abused the extensive powers accorded to the executive branch 
under a unitary and unicameral Westminster system.xxix These powers have not been 
curtailed but a more representative and assertive Parliament has strengthened the 
public accountability of ministers and reasserted longstanding expectations that 
ministers will exercise their formidable powers in line with public opinion rather 
against it. 
 
IV: accountability for outputs 
 
To what extent did the reforms live up to their supporters claim of increasing 
government accountability?   In the first place, the output-based framework failed to 
deliver the clarity of accountability that the reformers had hoped for. A perennial 
problem has been the definition of outputs (or output classes), namely the results for 
which departments would be accountable.  Even though outputs were deliberately 
preferred to outcomes as accountability targets because they were less ambiguous and 
more easily specified and measured, they often proved difficult to specify 
meaningfully.  The Treasury, as the agency overseeing the budgetary process, put 
much effort into helping departments define their outputs and output measures and 
was able to achieve a certain degree of consistency across the sector.xxx  However, 
outputs often remain comparatively uninformative guides to what the public can 
expect from their public servants. The theory of ex ante specification, on which 
contractual accountability depends, implies that someone dissatisfied with the 
performance of an agency will be able to point to a clause in the agreement and 
complain that it has not been met satisfactorily. In practice, however, interested 
parties, whether ministers, members of parliamentary committees, media 
commentators or members of the public, rarely, if ever, resort to output statements or 
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output measures as the basis for holding governments to account. Instead, they 
generally take it for granted that the agency is responsible for the policy or decision in 
question and proceed immediately to discuss its merits in terms of generally accepted 
performance standards, without reference to stated output or output measures.     
 
One reason for bypassing the output statements in public debate is that they are 
usually too unspecific to be of much assistance in nailing down the agency’s 
obligations.  Because of the uncertain political environment in which most 
government agencies operate, ex ante specification of what needs to be done tends to 
encourage vague and porous terminology, sufficiently general to cover any likely 
eventuality. xxxi   The difficulty of specifying output classes for government 
departments has been particularly associated with outputs for policy advice, one of the 
key areas in the core public service, where output classes typically are opaque and the 
performance measures banal.xxxii But the problem of accurate specification goes much 
further than the functions of formulating and recommending policy options. It also 
applies to most of the key areas of policy implementation, such as economic 
management, defence, security, diplomacy, law and order, health, education and 
social welfare. All these sectors have the potential to throw up unpredictable crises in 
which officials and government agencies will be called on to act creatively.  Only in a 
purely formalistic way, can governments be held accountable in terms of previous 
contractual commitments for the actions they take in such unforeseeable 
circumstances.   
The system mistakenly reduces all government activity to a form of quasi-material 
production in which the ‘products’ of government action can be meaningfully 
measured, counted and costed. In James Q. Wilson’s useful typology of agencies – 
production, procedural, craft and copingxxxiii   – the first type is privileged at the 
expense of the other three.xxxiv   Indeed, the number of core government agencies that 
fall into the ‘production’ category has tended to diminish under the impact of the 
NPM reform movement’s preference for outsourcing (contracting out).  Outsourcing 
has been found to be successful in precisely those areas where the services to be 
provided can be readily specified and monitored under a formal contract. In this case, 
reforming governments have arguably contracted out most areas of their activity 
where the contractual format is appropriate for implementing accountability. Not 
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surprisingly, therefore, the core public sector that remains is particularly unsusceptible 
to this contractual approach.   
  
Making agency heads accountable for a set of specified outputs was criticised as 
encouraging a ‘check-list’ approach to accountability. xxxv  Chief executives could 
content themselves with placing ticks against a set of narrowly specified tasks while 
losing sight of their overall responsibilities to the ministers and the public.  Certainly, 
if taken literally, the structure could induce an almost mechanistic approach to 
compliance. On the other hand, there is little evidence to suggest that senior public 
servants actually behaved in such a blinkered way, restricting themselves to the letter 
of their agreements. Rather, they continued to exercise flexible political judgment, no 
doubt out of motives of sheer personal survival as well as professional commitment.  
 
Critics of the reforms also argued that an emphasis on specified results could lead to a 
decline in notions of public service and public sector ethics as public servants were 
prepared to cut procedural and ethical corners through pressure to get the job done 
quickly and cheaply.xxxvi  On the other hand, evidence for such a decline is hard to 
find.xxxvii  At least within the ranks of the core public service (some crown entities and 
SOEs may be a different matter (see below)), New Zealand public servants have 
retained their reputation for integrity and professionalism.  
 
The continuation of previous practices and values under the new system may have 
confounded the pessimism of the critics. At the same time, it underlines the basic 
irrelevance of the output structure for public accountability. Because officials took 
care to define their outputs in broad, open-ended terms and did not take their 
agreements too literally as a restricted set of expected activities, they were able to 
proceed much as before.xxxviii  The public naturally took its cue from the leading 
participants, looking elsewhere than the stated outputs for means of holding 
government to account. 
Another aspect of the output structure which raised criticisms of undue narrowness 
was the deliberate separation of outputs from outcomes and the restriction of public 
servants to responsibility for outputs only, leaving them with no formal responsibility 
for the eventual outcomes which were the sole prerogative of ministers (Schick 1996, 
73). In practice, the separation of functions was unworkable. The distinction between 
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outcomes and outputs recycles the discredited distinction between policy, on the one 
hand, and administration or implementation on the other. xxxix  Professional public 
servants who were expected to assist their ministers and to support the government’s 
priorities could not distance themselves from the impact of their agencies’ operations.    
 
Subsequent amendments to the output/outcome framework sought to remedy this 
deficiency.  In New Zealand, the adoption, in 1994, of a government-wide strategic 
planning framework, using Strategic Result Areas (SRAs) and Key Result Areas 
(KRAs), xl  was an attempt to widen the focus of agency heads.  A similar concern is 
also evident in the Labour government’s recent introduction of departmental 
‘statements of intent’ which include reference to outcomes and reasons for their 
selection, though final responsibility for choosing outcomes is still left with 
ministers. xli   The lesson was not ignored elsewhere. When the Australian 
Commonwealth introduced its own version of the output/outcome budgetary system 
in the late 1990s, care was taken to include both outcomes and outputs in the 
objectives of departments.  
 
In terms of public accountability, this attempted restriction of public servants’ 
responsibilities had potentially the greatest impact in parliamentary committees where 
public servants are directly interrogated about their department’s performance. 
Questions about the impact of departmental policies could be deflected on the ground 
that outcomes are the responsibility of ministers not public servants. None the less, 
some committees, notably the Maori Affairs Committee, have been able to broaden 
debate to include discussion of policy outcomes. Moreover, conventions governing 
parliamentary committee procedure have always recognised the right of public 
servants to avoid answering politically controversial questions on the ground that they 
are matters of ministerial ‘policy’, itself an imprecise an inevitably contested claim.xlii  
In the absence of detailed research, there is no reason to think that the new framework 
significantly altered or clarified the boundary line between questions that public 
servants will answer and those that they will refer to their political superiors.  
Not that the output structure is totally without value for public accountability. Like 
any budgeting framework it provides a mechanism not only for appropriating public 
funds and but also for auditing expenditure. The detailed costing of output classes has 
enabled the Controller and Auditor-General and the Audit Office to examine whether 
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funds have been spent for their intended purposes.xliii   In addition, the focus on 
outputs rather than inputs has helped in the extension of the audit function beyond 
mere compliance auditing to non-financial performance or value-for-money 
auditing.xliv  Once agencies are explicit about their intended outputs and the measures 
by which these outputs are to be assessed, auditors can more readily provide an 
independent assessment to Parliament and the public of whether they agencies are 
meeting their stated objectives.  Indeed, government auditors are among the most 
enthusiastic supporters of the new structure, urging continuing development and 
refinement of its various elements.xlv   Overall, however, the specification of outputs 
does not appear to have delivered any major accountability dividend to the politicians 
or public or to have altered existing accountability practices as much as reformers had 
hoped or critics had feared. 
 
V: restricting political accountability 
 
The aspect of the public sector reforms which had the greatest effect on public 
accountability was not the output/outcome framework itself but the institutional 
decoupling and disaggregation that accompanied it.  Again, the stated intention was to 
improve accountability by separating functions and clarifying responsibilities but, in 
practice, the intention was not always achieved.   The key aim was to quarantine 
institutional responsibility for overall policy and political direction, a function of the 
elected government and its individual ministers, from the implementation and 
administration of policy, which was to be devolved to separate officials or agencies.  
The justification was based partly on a conviction about institutional capture, xlvi  
whereby general policy, which ought to be the prerogative of the democratically 
elected government, was unduly controlled by bureaucrats and state-paid 
professionals, such as teachers, doctors and social workers.  At the same time, 
managerial efficiency was compromised if ministers could intervene in operational 
details in response to political pressure.  The reformers thus exhibited the ambivalent 
attitude towards political control and accountability typical of the NPM movement.xlvii    
While they wished to reassert political control over policy, they also intended to limit 
control over day-today government operations. It was the latter trend, the attempted 
limitation on political control that had potentially the most significant effects on 
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accountability by restricting the scope of the central and most effective mechanism of 
public accountability, the chain of ministerial responsibility. 
The attempted restrictions on ministerial responsibility and accountability occurred in 
three areas.  One was in the core public service, in the redefined relationship between 
ministers and chief executives of government departments.  The second was in the 
broader public sector of crown entities and SOEs, where ministers dealt at arms-
length with more or less independent agencies.  The third was where functions were 
moved outside the public sector altogether, through outsourcing or privatisation.   
 
VI: Ministers and departmental heads 
 
How far the relationship between ministers and chief executives was actually changed 
by the reforms is a matter of dispute.xlviii  On the one hand, the introduction of the 
outcome/output distinction, with its clear demarcation of the respective roles of 
ministers and chief executives, was obviously  intended to distance the chief 
executive from the minister, making the minister responsible and accountable for 
overall direction and leaving the chief executive to accept responsibility and 
accountability for day-to-day operations of the department. On the other hand, apart 
from the traditional embargo on ministerial intervention in personnel decisions which 
was written into the new Act (State Sector Act 1988 s 33), ministers retained overall 
responsibility for their departments and chief executives were responsible to them for 
the conduct of the department. Ministers could still be, and are, called on to answer 
for any action taken within their departments. The State Services Commission, in its 
guidance material on public service principles, combines both principles: departments 
are ‘extensions of the minister acting in the minister’s name and in accordance with 
the minister’s wishes’ and chief executives have ‘delegated authority to enable the 
production of contracted outputs’ and are ‘accountable for the exercise of this 
authority’.xlix Thus both ministers and chief executives would appear to have the right 
and obligation to account publicly for the actions of departments.  
Some of the confusion derives from the traditional conventions of ministerial 
responsibility itself which are still the subject of dispute and misunderstanding.  The 
central accountability function of ministers in relation to departmental actions is to 
answer to the public, by providing information and taking any necessary steps to 
impose remedies and sanctions.  Accepting personal blame or penalty, including the 
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penalty of resignation or dismissal, is not expected unless the minister shares some 
direct personal responsibility and, even, then is largely a matter of political judgment.l    
A corollary of ministerial accountability for departmental action is that public 
servants remain anonymous, regardless of their personal responsibility, and leave the 
public answering to the minister. 
The convention that only ministers answer to the public while public servants remain 
unheard and unnamed has been steadily relaxed over several decades, beginning well 
before the public sector reforms.  Innovations such as the introduction of the 
Ombudsman, the extension of parliamentary select committee investigations and 
Official Information legislation all exposed public servants to direct public 
accountability.  The overall structure of ministerial responsibility, however, still 
remained, with ministers left to answer to Parliament and the media.  The NPM 
reforms, with their delineation of separate responsibilities for ministers and chief 
executives, have added further impetus to this trend, giving license to chief executives 
to respond directly to public concern over departmental actions.  As a result, senior 
public servants have become more visible in the media than previously and have 
sometimes been forced to carry the can for politically controversial decisions.li   
The potential for confusion over accountability roles of ministers and chief executives 
under the new structure was graphically illustrated in the aftermath to the Cave Creek 
tragedy where fourteen people lost their lives in 1995 after a poorly built public 
viewing platform collapsed.  The incident raises a number of major accountability 
issues and has been exhaustively analysed, particularly in relation to the question of 
allocating personal blame for collective failure.lii  Cave Creek was a classic case of 
the problem of ‘many hands’ where personal responsibility for collective failure is 
shared among a number of individuals and where blame attaches to the organisation 
as a whole rather than to any one person.  Public anger at the loss of life demands that 
heads should roll, particularly the head of the person in overall charge, provided that 
some, at least, of the personal responsibility can be sheeted home to that person.   But, 
in the case of Cave Creek, who was this person?  Traditional ministerial responsibility 
would argue for the head of the Minister, Denis Marshall, which was the option urged 
by the Opposition and the media.  In support, they argued that the systemic failure 
was partly due to shortage of funding, a ministerial responsibility.  However, the 
Chief Executive of the department concerned (the Department of Conservation), Bill 
Mansfield, not the Minister, accepted immediate responsibility for the disaster, 
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answering questions from the media, accepting collective responsibility and 
promising to investigate all aspects of the tragedy.liii  
Mansfield, with the Minister’s tacit support, was thus adopting the implications of the 
new structure which gives responsibility for departmental operations to the Chief 
Executive.  On this logic, it followed that the Chief Executive should have offered his 
scalp to appease the public’s demand for retributive justice.  Indeed, in response to the 
incident, the State Services Commission formulated rules about when chief executives 
should consider resignation for operational failure in their departments.liv  
In the event, neither Minister nor Chief Executive resigned in direct response to the 
tragedy (though the credibility of both was sufficiently damaged that they were 
subsequently forced to move on).  The main reason, no doubt, was the natural 
reluctance of any organisational head to take the rap for collective failure when most 
of the blame is thought to lie with subordinates.  But the new structure certainly 
helped to compound the difficulty by confusing the question of who was actually in 
charge and who should therefore take collective responsibility.  Traditional 
expectations that the minister was in charge of a department had been allowed to 
continue alongside a new framework which seemed to give prime responsibility for 
departmental actions to the chief executive.  The effort taken to clarify the respective 
accountability roles of ministers and chief executives thus proved counter-productive 
in a major crisis.  As the practical unreality of the output/outcome distinction indicates, 
a neat wedge cannot be driven between the duties of ministers and those of chief 
executives.  Both share in a common enterprise with overlapping goals but with the 
minister retaining ultimate control and accountability. 
Though the accountability role of ministers may have been somewhat weakened by 
the growing visibility of chief executives, few wish to see ministerial responsibility 
removed from its central role in defining the relationships between ministers, 
departments and the public.  Ministers who take the tempting route of dodging 
accountability for unpopular departmental decisions are still likely to face strong 
public criticism. lv   Particularly when ministers are not personally responsible for 
departmental mistakes or failures, they usually have more to gain by fronting up to the 
media themselves and promising remedial action than by passing the buck to an 
official.  Officials, in turn, as members of a professional bureaucracy, have every 
incentive to shun the media spotlight and to avoid compromising their political 
neutrality.  Damaging public conflict between the incoming Labour/Alliance 
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government and some senior public servants underlined the risks for professional 
public servants in acquiring a high public profile.lvi  The conventions of ministerial 
responsibility, though imprecise and sometimes flouted, remain fundamentally strong. 
 
VII: non-departmental agencies 
 
The strength of public expectations about ministerial responsibility also caused 
problems in the wider non-departmental public sector of crown entities and  SOEs, 
where ministers were much more unambiguously decoupled from day-to-day 
responsibility.  While core departments remained under ultimate ministerial control, 
crown entities and SOEs were legally independent.  SOEs were established as 
publicly owned trading companies, each with its own board who in turn appoint a 
chief executive.  The powers of ministers over SOEs were restricted to appointing the 
board, setting dividend levels, monitoring performance and agreeing to an annual 
Statement of Corporate Intent.lvii   Crown entities form a large residual category which 
includes the great range of publicly owned organisations that are neither core 
departments nor SOEs, for instance various service delivery agencies,  government 
boards and commissions, schools, hospitals and so on.lviii   All are to some extent at 
arms-length from ministers though most are heavily dependent on public funding, 
typically delivered through annual purchase agreements similar to those applying to 
departments.   
Non-departmental public bodies are subject to the normal public sector accountability 
agencies, such as the Audit Office and the Ombudsman.  Most must also report to 
Parliament and submit to scrutiny by parliamentary committees.  Such procedures are 
sometimes unwelcome to boards and managers with a private sector background, 
particularly in SOEs which have a largely commercial orientation and resist intrusion 
into matters of supposed commercial sensitivity which private companies would 
consider to be none of the public’s business. 
In theory, because of their arm-length status, the political accountability of non-
departmental bodies through the chain of ministerial responsibility is significantly less 
than for core government departments, making direct scrutiny through parliamentary 
committees even more important as an avenue of political accountability.  In the case 
of SOEs, in particular, ministers have usually been able to distance themselves from 
responsibility for individual decisions.lix  For instance, when the Post Office was a 
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government department under ministerial control, an uneconomic post office could 
rarely be closed for fear of local political repercussions relayed through the minister.  
Once the Post Office was corporatised, however, hundreds of post offices were closed 
and the government was able to disclaim all responsibility and accountability.   
In relation to crown entities, on the other hand, most of which are less easily 
assimilated to a commercial model than SOEs, ministers have been less able to resist 
public pressure to take responsibility for unpopular decisions.  In housing, for instance, 
responsibility for managing public housing was devolved to Housing New Zealand, a 
statutory body with its own government-appointed board and the objective of 
providing housing and related services profitably and efficiently.  However, because 
housing decisions were often politically controversial and seen to be matters of 
government policy, ministers were inevitably drawn into public discussion and 
defence of justification of Housing New Zealand decisions.  The management 
therefore found itself operating under conflicting objectives, required both to make a 
profit and to respond to the political demands of government, and therefore unable to 
keep to its official statutory role.lx  
Another problematic area has been the health sector which was restructured on a 
funder/purchaser/provider model with the aim of introducing market-based incentives 
and reducing political control and accountability.lxi   Even so, ministers could not 
distance themselves from controversial decisions lxii .  For instance, when kidney 
dialysis was denied to a dying patient by a crown entity hospital, the Minister of 
Health was forced to answer for the decision.lxiii Indeed, the attempt to quarantine the 
health service from political control and accountability proved so unpopular that the 
Labour/Alliance government returned to a form of the pre-reform structure whereby 
political accountability through the Ministry and the Minister is combined with 
accountability through locally elected board members  The government has thus opted 
for a plethora of overlapping accountability channels over any attempt at clarification 
and simplification.   
Individual crown entities, as well as some SOEs, have also been the subject of public 
criticism for behaviour considered inappropriate for public service agencies, for 
instance conspicuous corporate consumption and junketing,lxiv  extravagance in the 
employment of consultantslxv  and blatant lobbying in the pursuit of advantageous 
government policies. lxvi   In most cases, board members and executives could 
justifiably argue that they were acting within their statutory brief as independent 
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agencies and merely following practices standard in the non-government sector.  
However, public expectations, particularly when articulated through the media and the 
parliamentary opposition, tend to apply the same standards to all public employees, 
regardless of the precise legal status of the agency that employs them. 
The popular pull of ministerial responsibility, and the expectation that ministers will 
be accountable not only for government policy but also for the implementation of 
policy, has thus often overridden the reformers’ attempt to distance non-departmental 
government agencies from political control.  The public have simply refused to buy 
into the distinction between departments and crown entities and the simplistic 
demarcation between policy and delivery on which it is based.  A major weakness in 
the restructuring was that crown entities tended to be treated as a single catch-all 
category of arms-length agency. In fact, however, they range from agencies which 
have a well-established rationale for being independent of government interference, 
for instance judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, research institutes and cultural 
institutions, to agencies whose sole function is to deliver government policy, such as 
the Housing New Zealand or Work and Income New Zealand.  The current 
government therefore sponsored a new Crown Entities Bill that would clarify 
accountability relationships with ministers by providing for different categories of 
crown entity reflecting different levels of ministerial intervention.lxvii  
 
VIII: outsourcing and privatisation 
 
The more extreme types of decoupling removed functions entirely from the public 
sector, either through outsourcing to private sector contractors or through full 
privatisation, that is the full transfer of ownership to private owners.  In the case of 
outsourcing, which has been extensively adopted in most areas of government, 
governments retain responsibility and for funding and determining the services in 
question and therefore, in theory, remain as accountable for the quality of the final 
service as if it were provided by a government agency.  As with arms-length crown 
entities, the potential exists for ministers to distance themselves from unpopular 
decisions on the ground that detailed implementation is the responsibility of the 
contractor.  In practice, however, public pressures remains on ministers to take full 
responsibility for the outputs of private contractors.  Of more concern is the practical 
capacity of government agencies to monitor the performance of so many contractors 
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(over 1300 organisations for the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services in 
1999-2000lxviii ).  In addition, a major effect of outsourcing on accountability, as 
elsewhere, has been to restrict the range of matters for which providers are 
accountable, particularly on employment conditions where private sector standards 
apply rather than the public sector’ s stricter (and more costly) procedural fairness 
requirements.  On the whole, contractors are accountable for delivering results and 
less so for the processes by which results are achieved.  However, particularly with 
contracts to Maori groups, where the media and the public are very alert to alleged 
extravagance in the use of public funds, governments may be held accountable for 
how much contractors spend on themselves even when such questions are outside the 
specified terms of the contract. 
The most profound effect on public accountability was achieved through outright 
privatisation when the government sold its ownership rights in government 
corporations to private companies.  The process of corporatisation under the State 
Owned Enterprises Act 1986 allowed  SOEs to be turned into commercially-oriented 
companies, rendering their continued public ownership hard to justify and thus 
facilitating an eventual transfer of ownership to the private sector.  By the mid 1990s, 
most of the major SOEs had been privatised.lxix  Though subject to varying types of 
public regulation, privatised companies were effectively removed from the reach of 
political accountability.  Even here, however, as elsewhere,lxx  ministers can still be 
called to account for the failure of privatised services such as railways or national 
airlines.  
 
IX: Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the New Zealand experiment in public accountability appears to 
confirm the irremediable complexity of accountability structures in modern 
democracies which derives from the complexity of government systems and of the 
policies and decisions that governments produce.  From an analysis which deplored 
that fact that government agencies and their political masters operated under 
ambiguous objectives with conflicting lines of accountability, the reformers set out to 
clarify both the demands made on ministers, agencies and their managers and also the 
mechanisms through which they were to be held accountable.  Overall, however, the 
quest for greater clarity through disaggregation and specification proved elusive. 
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When the new structure came under pressure as a result of public dissatisfaction with 
government performance, it was simply swept aside by the long-established 
mechanisms of ministerial and parliamentary accountability.    
These mechanisms, for all their ambiguity over who is accountable for what, do at 
least harness two central features of the constitution – the publicity guaranteed by 
Parliament (and exploited by a free media) and the executive power of elected 
ministers to impose remedies in response to public pressure. In Westminster systems 
such as New Zealand, the conventions of ministerial responsibility are so entrenched 
in the political culture that they cannot easily be overturned simply by altering the 
formal, legal relationships between ministers and public servants or even by 
devolving responsibility to the private sector.  So long as elected governments retain 
overall control through their extensive executive powers, they will be held 
accountable for government policy. The public, including the media, will not easily 
surrender a mechanism that provides the most reliable means of placing the 
government under pressure to be publicly accountable.   
 
As New Zealand adopts the new slogans of ‘whole-of-government’, ‘networks’ and 
‘partnerships’ even greater strains will be placed on the current accountability 
framework.  Though, for reasons of political amour propre, changes will be described 
as modifications which leave the fundamentals unaltered, they will pose further 
challenges to the structure of specified departmental outputs and outcomes which 
remains at the heart of the structure.  Analysts within the State Services Commission 
have already noted the difficulty of devising clear lines of accountability and clear ex 
ante expectations within a system that is designed to encourage shared responsibilities 
for outcomes, institutional learning, and flexible responses.lxxi  In this environment, 
the emphasis on the costing and measuring of agency outputs will become even more 
tangential to the reality of agency performance.  At the same time, the conventions of 
ministerial responsibility and upwards accountability within agencies can be expected 
to exercise a strong pull towards institutional hierarchy and official risk aversion, thus 
confounding the hopes of the new whole-of-government revisionists as much as they 
did those of their radical predecessors.  
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